Guerrero and Lapadula: The double 9 and the “hierarchy” trap

Two added cracks do not make a mega attack. Not always, in any case. The success of a team depends on aligning complementary values ​​in the functions, not by adding elements that overlap. The historic coach Julio Velasco said: “You don’t win with eleven Maradonas or eleven Cuciuffos. Maradona needs Cuciuffo, and vice versa.” The cracks give a logical sensation of “hierarchy”, but the mistake is in forcing the presence of everyone in the lineup at the same time, believing that the more figures, the higher the level. In recent decades, the idea of ​​”we cannot do without the hierarchy” has caused many of the Peruvian coaches to look for convoluted proposals to add all possible talented players into a single eleven, as if the happy ending could always be Brazil in the 1970s. And No.

There are too many stories in which, by wanting to add a heavyweight to the force in the team, harmony, method and even style are lost. Let’s go to the case of Cubillas. His insertion in the 1982 World Cup team was not against his sporting conditions -impeccable even at 32 years old-, but because he was introduced as a starter after his absence in three qualifying games forced the substitution of a natural 9 -La Rosa- and the loss of a tactical center forward like this. Tim reasoned that neither Cubillas nor Uribe could miss it, so he sent Julio César to play as ‘9’, as a striker, a position in which he failed with not a little noise. That Peru, if you look closely, was filled with flyers, it had almost no forwards and players who grew up downloading passes -Cueto, for example- had no one to train. Tim’s phrase about César – “I will die without knowing why Cueto did not make a good pass in Spain 82″ – could be explained with a question: Which forward did you want me to pass it to, Tim?

Let’s go to the case of Pizarro. It is about another “unmissable” that could not be seated in the selection, due to his great background in Europe. However, having Paolo as a contemporary -another who could not leave, due to his international curriculum- made the selectors, from Autuori to Markarián, bet on the famous double 9, in which Paolo and Claudio alternated the position of killer . The truth, rather than add up, they overlapped. But it was necessary to put them, otherwise “we lose hierarchy” (sic). It was only when Pizarro ceased to be essential in the national team due to age -Gareca had that “luck”, who took him at the age of 35-, the ‘Bomber’ was called off and Paolo was able to reposition himself as the only 9. Master and owner of the area, Guerrero has never played better with Peru. The coach also moved the chips with a key change: he did not replace Claudio with another striker but with a striker like Cueva, a player who opened flanks and somehow recovered the old idea of ​​the assisting midfielder.

This review makes sense regarding the Guerrero-Lapadula duo, the recent bet of the Reynoso coach against Japan. As a specific option in a game, go and pass. But as a fixed or permanent line-up for Peru, the idea is bad because it sacrifices the great moment of a footballer like Cagliari’s who is in his “prime” playing as a final reference, without having to back down or having someone in front of him. Although they are two footballers with different characteristics -more varied than Paolo’s with Claudio, for example-, both are goalscorers and need to be “inside”. Let’s not lose elaboration by tempting ourselves with the delusional idea that the sum Paolo + Lapadula translates into more goals. Let’s not think that adding them to the bad will always give us “hierarchy”. Let’s not fall into the trap.