Why does the best Peruvian coach fail?

Sitting at the long conference table at La Videna, without the federation president or general director next to him, Juan Reynoso He appeared alone before the press – that “demon” -, like someone who stops in front of a wall. He never loved them, except for two or three who said amen to him. He was never loved by the guild either. As a player first and a coach later, Reynoso was slow and difficult. “Forget it, I’m invisible.”he responded to EC when in 2010 we invited him to receive an award as coach of the year. “Are you clowning, Alan?” He told Alan Diez when he asked him in a hallway in Ate. The remnants of his fights with the press from when he was captain of the group selected In the 90s they always came back. “Some press evaluates with resentment”, he told EC in 98 to Wilder Buleje. And he finished with a phrase that could have the same validity today: “I feel more valued in Mexico than in Peru”.

What Wikipedia doesn’t say is that Reynoso doesn’t manage teams, he cups them. It takes them, modulates them in such a way that it takes charge of almost everything related to that brand. That’s how it was in Bolo, in the U, in Melgar. This is what he did in the national team. Because, although his contract said that the mission was the playoffs, he talked about training more athletes than pericoteros in the future; to create Peru brand players and to achieve “chameleonic” footballers who can play in one way and two minutes later, with an indication from them, in another position. Reynoso returned to the national team not as a coach, but as the king of Videna, supported by his chemistry with Lozano, his connection with Oblitas and, above all, by a chain of successes in clubs that would make anyone who achieved it a candidate: champion in provinces, champion in Lima and champion in Mexico. Add to that the fact that he was captain of the national team for 6 years – before Maturana fired him in 2000 – and the parable of the prodigal son was painted for him.

His numbers spoke, in some way, for him. Since he started as a coach in 2007, he has coached 390 games in Peru, winning 170, drawing 110 and losing 110. A 53% effectiveness rate. In that period he won titles with Bolo, the U and a Melgar whom he almost refounded. Only Mosquera comes close to him in terms of achievements, but Reynoso surpasses him in points achieved in Libertadores. He is also successful abroad. The ‘big head’ got Puebla into the semifinals and Cruz Azul, where he is an idol, made him semi-annual champion after 23 years. Although formatively he is more “Mexican than Peruvian”, he was the local coach who, by consensus, was running for Videna. Gareca, even once questioned by an eventual Peruvian replacement, said “Juan.”

Oblitist? Every time less

An old soccer fan, Reynoso had an enormous challenge: to care for and improve the legacy of his predecessor. It’s supposed to be the coaches’ job. That’s what they are hired for. For that and not to collect Gareca’s figures, Lozano claimed. And Reynoso accepted, with some added consideration. He brought his trusted Mexicans. His friends to key positions. To the marketing manager. To his son-in-law Serna in the sub 20. To his assistant Ortega. He recovered the psychologist Marquez. He suggested Chemo in the sub 23. And, of course, he moved away from Oblitas, to practically eliminate that “advisor” figure that Gareca did have. All of his decisions seemed to exceed those of a simple coach and were more like those of a great head of the Technical Unit, a candidate to stay for life.

His former mentor, Oblitas, looks like him and doesn’t look like him. He is similar to him in the professionalism to have a successful career as a player and as a coach in a medium – the Peruvian one – not ready to provide support. Both were persistent in growing abroad and becoming more valuable for it. They are not similar in character: Oblitas is more open, empathetic and socially skilled. Reynoso is more closed and very territorial. They also do not coincide in his directing styles. One is more classic, the other is more dedicated to technological tools. In the ’98 qualifiers they were a handful. Oblitas was the father of a team where Reynoso was the older brother who supported him. As a manager and technician they did not do well. In Cristal 2010 Reynoso bought players who only served him but not Cristal (read Shoro), Oblitas did not stop him and the campaign was bad. Although they are not public enemies, in this more adult stage their relationships seem to be on a different frequency. Furthermore, in his final presentation before the board of directors, a meeting to which Oblitas was not invited, it was clear that Reynoso did not agree with Juan Carlos’s role as he had proposed. According to reports, he did not feel it was useful or necessary. On the other side there was no longer the same sympathy. A source from the board of directors says that when, after the 0-2 against Argentina, Reynoso, without an iota of self-criticism, said that he saw himself in office “until the end of 2025,” Oblitas decided to remove him, even against the doubts of Lozano who He asked to “rethink the idea” (sic). There is no doubt that in the last stretch Reynoso was more fresh than oblitist.

The Moneyball Technician

At the management level, Reynoso belongs to the breed of coaches who feel more important than the players. And he is one of those coaches who, even if they no longer play, want to win the games. For the last few years, this Peruvian trained in Mexico has been our Moneyball coach, a pragmatist who, despite his past of reckless defense, today measures everything and analyzes so much. He doesn’t have a big “outward” speech. He is more of a workaholic who builds bonds indoors. His relationship with the players is not bad, but it is marked by “today I’ll tell you, tomorrow I don’t know.” In clubs, the weekly measurements of a footballer are not so far from date to date and there were more common headlines. In monthly Qualifiers, on the other hand, the physical difference from one match to the next gave more room for a September starter to be a substitute in October. That’s why he sat Tapia and chose Santamaría against Argentina. Or that’s why he sat Trauco down and put… Loyola. Stubborn in his logic, a slave to analytics, Reynoso put together a team where the only one who didn’t come out was Gallese.

Already fallen from grace on matchday 3, against Chile, Reynoso saw his character faded amid contradictions. He said that he would respect what Gareca did, but he killed any idea of ​​a base or backbone. He did not repeat two central defenders, he did not distinguish who would be his basic laterals and not even Paolo was saved from his moves. He said that his obsession was planning for the future and he did not invest any of the 8 friendlies to try Quispe or Grimaldo as starters. When they played, it was in the middle of the Qualifiers jungle. He said that League 1 was not competitive, very true, but he ended up playing with almost half of the starters coming from it. He said, already bordering on the blopper, that Peru did have shots on goal, because there was a concept that was a “risk situation”, equivalent in his analysis to shots on goal. Disappointed after having underestimated the elimination pace, Reynoso ended up being hacked by 99% of the press. And if before the Peruvian coach was supported by the company that had the rights and they killed him on the radio in the morning, today Succar was the same hit as “Tigrillo”. Or Ruiz de Somocurcio than Mister Peet. Voila, he had achieved unanimity.

Reynoso’s initial diagnosis of the selection and its emergencies failed. He misread his times, radicalized his trial/error method in the middle of the playoffs and completely disfigured the above. The deadlines devoured him and since he did not build solid armor inside Videna, he was isolated in record time. The phrase that “the best is not always the best” took on new life. Pound for pound, perhaps Reynoso has more tactical insight than Gareca, but the handling of the “selection” situation, in its haste and demands, in addition to his empathy with that touch of Peruvian taste, gave him more chances of fitting the Argentine than the own local element.

In short, the Reynoso plan fails because his election was based more on a “his turn” than on a real analysis of the possibilities of his profile. Lozano/Oblitas’ reading did not point so much to factors in his way of being but rather to reward a coach with positive results. It did not seem important if his style unified or divided, if his management distanced people from the national team concept or if his egocentric character would make him believe that he could turn 30-year-old players into “chameleons.” No. What led him to the national team were the triumphs on the field. When he stopped having them, and without back or extra credit to support him, Reynoso fell like anyone else. Without further attenuation. And by the hand of those who only months ago flanked him at that table.